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Various reports published by International Economic Institutions, including the World
Trade Organisation (WTO), stress the significance of Global Value Chains (GVCs)
for development. The common claim they make is that, although GVCs have existed
for a long time, the level and intensity of global interaction is rapidly changing,
and so is the nature of trade. Whereas ‘classic’ international trade consisted of
the exchange of goods manufactured for the most part within national borders,
production today increasingly entails intermediate goods and services (parts,
components and tasks) that originate from different parts of the world.
According to the narrative of these reports, ‘development’ today requires the ability
of states to create a regulatory environment that enables efficient companies to
‘technologically upgrade’ and insert themselves in GVCs so as to add value and
consequently reap a greater share of revenues. As development is equated with
greater value-capture, ‘developing countries’ are expected to adopt a new set of
rules to facilitate and expand value chain trade. Referred to as ‘WTO plus and
extra’ provisions because they go well beyond current liberalization commitments
and extend to areas not covered by the Organization, these rules strengthen the
protection of investors’ rights, particularly their intangible rights, and enhance the
free movement of capital.
Value chain trade: a new development dawn?
I start with two observations before making a point about value. The first is that
the insistence that so-called developing countries acknowledge and adjust to the
prevailing trade-related development wisdom is not something new within the
multilateral trade system but can be traced back to post/colonial times. As post-
development and TWAIL scholars have argued colonialism has shaped not only the
formation of modern legal doctrines and post-war institutions; but also the very idea
of development, as a system of (European) knowledge that has ordered the world
through very problematic hierarchies  – racial and cultural first, and economic later –
requiring societies at the end of the development spectrum to abide by the rationality
of those at the top. The second observation is that, contrary to the assumption that
law needs to adjust or adapt to exogenous economic processes like GVCs, law can
be seen to participate in the making of these processes. As critical legal scholars
have pointed out, there is a plurality of ways in which the law shapes, whilst in
turn being affected by, the structure and organisation of production globally (from
trade, corporate, property, investment, arbitration, land, and labour law to private
contracting, licensing and standards). How this web of law works in each instance is
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an empirical question but the point is that law shapes the creation and proliferation of
these networks, thereby contributing to the production and distribution of economic
rewards along these chains.
Technological upgrade and social downgrade: an
anomaly?
And here we come to the issue of value in global chains: the assumption these
reports make is that firms’ insertion into GVCs and, especially, value-capture, will
deliver ‘development’ – by which they generally mean more jobs and higher income
for workers. This assumption is problematic not only because there is little evidence
that technological upgrade is happening beyond dynamic emerging economies, but
also because, once we leave the realm of quantitative indicators, qualitative analysis
tells us that where it is happening, technological upgrade is often accompanied by
so-called social downgrade, that is the deterioration of working and living conditions.
In other words, value considered a la Porter as innovation and product differentiation
whose fruits trickle down, generating benefits for all, cannot explain this situation
where value creation is actually ‘welfare-reducing’. I suggest that one lens for making
sense of the co-existence of technological upgrade and social downgrade in what
Danielsen calls ‘value chain capitalism’ is provided by work on social reproduction.
Social reproduction is generally associated with biological reproduction, including
sexual, affective and emotional services; unpaid production of goods and services
in the home and within the community; and also the reproduction of culture and
ideology.
Value and social reproduction
I draw on the work of anti-capitalist and post-colonial feminists who have identified
the separation between the sphere of economic production and that of social
reproduction, and the constant redrawing of their boundaries, to be essential
features of capitalism. The specific argument is that, by making social reproduction
activities – as well as the informal labour performed by the majority of people in the
world and the contribution of environmental resources – invisible or considering
them less productive of value, profits can be made and capital can accumulate (see
also Oliver Schlaudt’s contribution to this symposium). Case studies, for instance,
have shown how it’s women’s reproductive labour that provides ‘a subsidy to
production under supply chains’ enabling firms to achieve technologically upgrade.
The second reason this work is important is that it sees the crucial role that social
divisions and hierarchies have played in processes of capital accumulation: not
only gender, sexuality and class; but also race and geography have been used
to devalue certain types of labor to extract value between and within countries.
If this body of work sees capital accumulation as a powerful organising logic for
economic and social relations, this is not because it considers it to be an ubiquitous
or all encompassing force. Rather, as Mezzadra and Neilson have pointed out, ‘it
is necessary to keep both the systematic and differentiating abilities of capitalism in
view’, in order to understand how (capitalist) value continues to be produced despite
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the heterogeneity characterising forms of labour, production and regulation, and
despite the simultaneous presence of non-capitalist values.
Comparative advantage and Social Inequalities
Thus conceived, a social reproduction lens enables us to appreciate how not only
the current development agenda of the WTO but the whole conceptual apparatus
of international trade law (and I would say international economic law) are built
exactly on this dynamics of exclusion or devaluation of the contribution that social
reproductive, informal and informalised labour and environmental resources make to
the transnational production of value, including within chains. How so? International
trade law is based on the free trade belief that countries trade with one another
because they have different competitive advantages. It is assumed that as a
consequence of competitive advantage all countries gain from trading with one
another. The problem with this assumption is that the acquisition of competitive
advantage (the ways firms or states come to be competitive) is a process already
permeated by social inequalities. Underpinning gender inequalities in the labour
market, as Folbre has argued, is the pursuit of competitive advantage by avoiding to
pay the full costs of the reproduction of the labour force. For example firms may hire
workers with fewer care responsibilities; establish themselves in jurisdictions where
they pay less tax to support public education, health services or environmental
regulation; or, to avoid incurring such ‘costs’, use contracts that shift the burden onto
local contractors.
Provocations: law and beyond
A social reproduction lens shows that the way in which workers and the environment
are treated and regulated is constitutive of what we call competitive advantage,
rather than being its consequence or externality. This may explain why ‘social
downgrade’ takes place even when there is technological upgrade and value-
capture. It’s not an anomaly; it’s integral to the way in which capital accumulation
takes place within chains. By adopting a social reproduction lens we can
problematize assumptions about the gains from competitive advantage for workers,
the environment and states between and within the Global North and the Global
South. More broadly, a social reproduction lens, as one among many conceptual
resources, enables us to do two things: analytically, to critique the legal systems
that continue to ignore the contribution that social reproductive, informal/informalised
labour and environmental resources make to the transnational creation, extraction
and distribution of economic value. Politically, it may enable us to lay normative
claims on states, companies and institutions, for instance demanding that they
recognize the contribution of these resources through a different regulation of labour,
taxation, socio-economic rights, the environment and so on. But demands need not
be confined to the legal domain, for law has its limits too. They can be also thought
of as provocations that aim to support, enable or create alternative value-making
processes, for instance through collective action and other forms of action orientated
political economy. What form these alternative arrangements might take in each
individual instance is an empirical question, as Amy Cohen’s work shows. A social
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reproduction lens offers the possibility of remaining attentive to the mechanisms that
enable capitalist value to be produced on a global scale, but also to the relevance of
other values, actually existent or not, that coexist with, even as they are obfuscated
by, those informing current socio-economic action. Indeed social reproduction is not
just the realm on which capital relies to extract value, but also the terrain on which to
struggle for engendering alternative valorisation processes.
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